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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis, we investigate how monetary incentive schemes inuence pro-
motion and distribution decisions in the presence of favoritism.
In chapter 2, we theoretically analyze the relationship between manage-
rial incentives and promotion quality in the presence of favoritism, stating
that incentives crowd out favoritism and lead to better promotion decisions.
Testing this hypothesis empirically, we nd a positive relationship between
the use of managerial incentives and promotion quality in German rms.
In chapter 3, we point out a drawback of high promotion prizes in tourna-
ments with favoritism: In the presence of favoritism supervisors gain utility
by awarding the tournament prize to their favored agent and are less likely
to promote the more able agent. For large prizes, this e¤ect outweighs the
incentive e¤ect of the tournament prize. Consequently, the agents e¤ort
declines in the prize. In chapter 4, we experimentally investigate favoritism-
induced selection e¤ects by forming 3-person groups with two friends and
an anonymous player in a distribution game. Anonymous players avoid the
distribution game, fearing harmful collaborations of the befriended partic-
ipants. Incentives for decision-makers partially crowd out favoritism and
the anonymous player enters the distribution game. Chapter 5 deals with a
methodological problem in experimental economics. It is a common practice
to conduct experimental sessions, evaluate the resulting data and conduct
further sessions if no signicant results are attained. We illustrate that this
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approach leads to a Type I Error ination and make suggestions for better
experimental planning.
One core problem in contract theory is the alignment of goals in a prin-
cipal agent setting. The principal wants the agent to supply e¤ort, whereas
the agent does not want to exert costly and unobservable e¤ort once a con-
tract is signed. Proper incentives mitigate the moral hazard problem by
tying the agents compensation to an observable signal which consists of her
unobservable e¤ort and a noise component.1 One key assumption is that a
proper signal is contractible. Typically, this assumption is fullled in the
eld if the agents output is quantiable in terms of pieces produced, revenue
raised, cars repaired or trees planted. Not surprisingly, in this environment,
incentive schemes do a pretty good job in increasing worker productivity
when compared to xed wages (Lazear (2000) and Shearer (2004)). But es-
pecially white-collar jobs often involve tasks which are di¢ cult to measure
and make an objective performance evaluation too costly, if not impossible
(Murphy and Cleveland (1995) and Prendergast (1999)). In this case, the
pay for performance approach is not feasible in the simple form described
above. This problem becomes even worse when an agent works on multiple
tasks. For applying the optimal incentive scheme, not only one, but multiple
signals are needed. If one or more signals are not feasible, the multi tasking
problem applies and incentivizing a subset of tasks leads to the disregard of
unincentivized tasks (Holmström and Milgrom (1991)).
One solution to this problem is the use of subjective performance evalua-
tions by supervisors. Since a supervisor has a picture of an agents tasks and
performance, her subjective evaluation should be a decent performance sig-
nal. Though a fair subjective evaluation is not contractible, the agent might
accept contracts involving subjective evaluations due to repeated interaction
or the supervisors reputation or trustworthiness. Despite the fact that sev-
eral ndings point out the advantages of subjective performance evaluations
(Baker et al. (1994) and Baiman and Rajan (1995)) there is a major draw-
back: Supervisors have discretion in evaluating an agents performance. If
1See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for an overview. For seminal contributions see f.i.
Jensen (1976), Grossman and Hart (1983) and Holmström and Milgrom (1987).
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a supervisor is not the residual claimant, but is herself an agent, she might
follow her own interests when evaluating subordinates, rather than report-
ing her true expectations about the agents performance. Indeed, a couple
of studies have pointed out political reasons as the primary determinant for
subjective evaluations (Longenecker et al. (1987) and Bjerke et al. (1987)).
According to anecdotal evidence in Ittner et al. (2003), discretion in balanced
scorecard systems leads to extreme forms of favoritism and arbitrariness by
supervising managers.
Prendergast and Topel (1996) theoretically analyze this setting by intro-
ducing favoritism in a LEN framework. Technically speaking, the supervisor
gains utility from the well-being of her subordinates. This may lead to low-
powered incentives for the subordinates, since higher powered incentives also
strongly a¤ect the supervisors utility, and thus, lead to higher distortions in
the evaluations.
In chapter 2, we apply the approach from Prendergast and Topel (1996)
on job promotion tournaments. If a manager has preferences over agents,
i.e., likes agent A more than agent B, she has a natural inclination not to
promote the best, but the best liked agent. In the absence of managerial
incentives, the manager will always promote her favorite agent. However,
in the presence of incentives, the manager has to trade o¤ between utility
from favoritism and utility from promoting the best performing agent. The
likelihood of promoting the better agent increases with the incentives for the
promoting manager. This theoretical result suggests a real world correlation
between managerial incentives and promotion quality in rms. Furthermore,
the model suggests that in the presence of weak or moderate favoritism, low
managerial incentives already have a substantial impact on promotion qual-
ity. Medium or high managerial incentives only slightly increase the promo-
tion quality compared to low incentives. Hence, the model predicts similar
correlations for promotion quality with low, medium and high managerial
incentives.
We empirically test these predictions with a representative employer-
employee matched database containing 36,000 employee survey observations
from 305 rms. In addition to the survey, the dataset contains rm-level in-
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formation about compensation and HR practices in the respective rms. We
measure promotion quality by employeesdegree of agreement to the state-
ment "Promotions go to those who best deserve them" on a 5-point Likert
scale. As explanatory variables, we use the existence and strength of man-
agerial performance related pay and the utilization of gain sharing plans.
The ordered probit regression reveals that in rms using performance related
pay (gain sharing plans) for their managers, employees are 8.3% (8.8%) more
likely to have a positive opinion about their rms promotion policy. To test
the second theoretical prediction, we regress promotion quality on 3 dummy
variables, which capture whether the variable pay component in a rm makes
up 1-10%, 10-20%, or more than 20% of a managers total compensation. As
theoretically suggested, rms which pay 10-20% or more than 20% of their
managerscompensation by variable components do not have a higher per-
ceived promotion quality compared to rms which only pay 1-10% in variable
terms.
In chapter 3, we use a theoretical setup similar to that of chapter 2 to
analyze the impact of favoritism on the agents e¤ort supply in promotion
tournaments. As we already show in chapter 2, favoritism distorts the pro-
motion decision to the favor of the more liked agent and reduces the winning
chances of the less liked agent. Lower winning chances lead to lower e¤ort
supply by the less liked agent. The favored agent anticipates her competi-
tors rationale and also lowers her e¤ort. This e¤ect is already known from
tournaments with favorites and underdogs. Once a player has a winning
margin, the underdog reduces e¤ort, and consequently, the favorite reduces
her e¤ort also.2 Di¤erent to the standard case, the winning margin is not
constant, but is increasing in the tournament prize if favoritism is in place.
Since the supervisor gains from the favored agents utility, high tournament
prizes lead to a stronger promotion distortion and an even bigger advantage
for the favored agent. The higher the prize, the higher the distortion by
the supervisor, and the lower is the winning chances for the less liked agent.
2Note that from the experimental point of view, underdogs regulary supply substan-
tially more e¤ort than theoretically predicted. (Bull et al. (1987), Schotter and Weigelt
(1992) and van Dijk et al. (2001))
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If this e¤ect is stronger than the pure incentive e¤ect of the higher prize,
agents e¤ort decrease in the tournament prize. Our results suggest, that
in the presence of favoritism and subjective performance evaluations, high
tournament prizes might backre with low e¤ort supply.
The models described in chapter 2 and chapter 3 abstract from agents
participation constraints. Disfavored agents have no possibility of leaving the
tournament or the company. In a wider approach with strong favoritism or
low job search costs, agents might react to favoritism by quitting jobs. An
example for strong favoritism or even primogeniture are family rms in which
family members are often promoted quicker and receive higher wages than
non-family members (Pérez-González (2006)). If promotions are quicker due
to family a¢ liation, non-family members have lower chances in promotion
tournaments and might leave the company. However, incentivizing e¢ ciency-
centered decisions might reduce favoritism in these organizations and encour-
age non-favored agents to enter, or not to leave the company. In chapter 4,
we follow this idea in the laboratory. We use a 2-stage 3-player game in
which an unrelated anonymous Player A has to decide whether to enter a
distribution game or to take an outside option. If she enters the game her
payo¤ depends on the goodwill of Player C, who distributes money between
Player A and Player B. If Player C and Player B are friends and Player C re-
ceives a xed wage for her decision, Player A refrains from entering the game
because of favoritism. She is right in doing so, since Player C strongly favors
her friend in the distribution decision. However, incentivizing Player C for
choosing an e¢ cient allocation crowds out favoritism and Player A is more
inclined to enter the game. The results suggest that unrelated agents antici-
pate the incentive structure in organizations and expect e¢ ciency enhancing
incentives to reduce favoristic behavior.
Chapter 5 deals with a practice in experimental economics which we name
result-based sampling (RBS). Experimenters often conduct experiments in
period 1, explore their data and decide upon on the basis of their ndings how
to proceed. If they nd signicant results, they often nish the experiment
and aim for publication. If the data does not show up the suggested results,
they abort the project. However, if results are close to signicance, many
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researchers increase their sample size by conducting further sessions in period
2. The guiding principle behind this approach is that the treatment e¤ect
in question might be too small for detection with the current sample size,
but may be detected with an increased sample. This argument is valid at
rst glance, since increasing the sample size indeed reduces the likelihood of
not rejecting the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is indeed false.
But RBS has a crucial drawback: Given the null hypothesis to be true,
5% of all researchers come out with wrong positive results after period 1.
Some of the remaining 95% of researchers apply RBS, increase their sample
size in period 2 and gain signicant results. Summing up signicant results
from the rst and the second period shows that substantially more than
5% of all projects end up with wrong positive results. Under reasonable
assumptions and a signicance level of 5%, RBS leads to a Type I Error of
7-8%. To overcome RBS, we propose to determine a target sample size before
conducting experiments. If the target sample size is reached the experimenter
should not further increase the sample size, because this would lead to a Type
I Error ination.
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Chapter 2
Managerial Incentives and
Favoritism in Promotion
Decisions - Theory and Field
Evidence1
2.1 Introduction
In most jobs work performance is not perfectly reected in objective perfor-
mance measures. As a consequence superiors are often asked to rate their
subordinates subjectively, which gives them the possibility to favor one sub-
ordinate over another. As a consequence, performance appraisals may be
biased, not reecting actual work performance but the supervisors personal
preferences for her subordinates. If internal promotion decisions are based
on subjective performance appraisals, favoritism may eventually result in not
promoting the best but those who are best liked.
To avoid favoritism, pay and promotions are sometimes solely determined
by seniority and other bureaucratic rules which of course also bear the risk
of poor promotion decisions (Prendergast and Topel (1996), Marsh (1960)).
Another solution has been suggested by Prendergast and Topel (1993) who
1This chapter is based upon Berger et al. (2011).
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claim that a means of aligning the supervisors incentives with those of
the organization is to tie rewards to promotion and to make the supervisor
responsible for the output of the job to which his subordinates are promoted
(Prendergast and Topel (1993), p. 360).
In this paper we investigate this idea in detail and analyze the relation-
ship between managerial incentives and promotion decisions. First, we the-
oretically explore the e¤ect of favoritism on managerspromotion decisions.
Favoritism indeed leads to poor promotion decisions as the more able subor-
dinate is less likely promoted. Workers anticipate their superiors bias and
reduce e¤orts in promotion tournaments. Thus favoritism not only harms
the company ex-post by putting the wrong people into management positions
but it also reduces e¤ort supply and therefore expected company earnings ex-
ante. Tying the managers salary to workersperformances makes favoritism
costly and leads to better promotion decisions.
To test the theoretical predictions, we use a unique employer-employee
matched data set collected on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of La-
bor and Social A¤airs by the Great Place to Work Institute, a company
specialized in conducting employee surveys, in 2006. The dataset is a repre-
sentative sample of 305 German rms containing company-level information
on management practices. In addition, in each of the rms an employee-
survey has been conducted, containing detailed information about employee
perceptions of approximately 36,000 individuals. In contrast to researchers
who try to assess promotion quality as an outsider to the rm, employees
have inside knowledge and are in a good position to judge whether indeed the
best people are promoted. We thus focus on a standardized item contained
in the employee-survey which measures whether "promotions go to those who
best deserve them".
Indeed, we nd that the quality of promotion decisions is signicantly
higher in rms which use managerial incentive schemes. Furthermore, the
data suggest that even lower powered incentive schemes su¢ ce to reduce
favoritism in promotions which is in line with the theoretical prediction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we summarize the related literature. In sections 2.3 and 2.4 we theoretically
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derive predictions on the consequences of managerial pay for promotion de-
cisions. Section 2.5 describes our dataset and the main variables used for
the empirical analysis. Section 2.6 includes the main empirical results while
section 2.7 discusses obtained results and summarizes our main ndings.
2.2 Related Literature
The role of favoritism and social connectivity in rms has gained considerable
attention in theoretical economic research in recent years. Prendergast and
Topel (1996) were among the rst who analyze how personal preferences to-
wards employees may lead to favoritism and biased performance appraisals.
In their model supervisors derive utility from biasing performance appraisals
according to individual preferences. Favoritism then leads to a misallocation
of workers to jobs and higher powered worker incentives aggravate this prob-
lem. Prendergast (2002) extends this framework and shows that noisy en-
vironments reduce favoritism-induced distortions. Fairburn and Malcomson
(2001) illustrate that bribery-induced favoritism o¤sets the e¤ect of mone-
tary bonus schemes and suggest job promotion tournaments to mitigate the
incentives to bribe and thus reduce favoritism.
A couple of studies empirically investigate the harmful inuence of fa-
voritism. Longenecker et al. (1987) and Bjerke et al. (1987), for instance,
examine determinants of performance evaluations in a US company and the
US Navy respectively. Both studies claim that political considerations rather
than true performance are reected in subjective evaluations. This is espe-
cially true if performance appraisals are tied to bonuses. Ittner et al. (2003)
analyze a balanced scorecard bonus plan which is based on supervisorssub-
jective evaluations. Even if nancial measures for evaluating subordinates
are available, supervisorsdiscretion leads to strong favoritism in employees
bonus payments in the studied company and nally to the abolishment of
the scorecard. Breuer et al. (2010) analyze personnel data from a call cen-
ter organization arguing that social ties triggered by repeated interaction or
small team size lead to biased performance evaluations by supervisors.
Several other studies have examined resta¢ ng decisions in the presence
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of family ties, which can be seen as a prominent case of favoritism in rms.
Pérez-González (2006) report a faster career as well as higher wages for fam-
ily members in family rms. Kramarz and Skans (2007) nd that young
Swedish men frequently work in their fathers plant while having higher ini-
tial wages and worse school grades than comparable colleagues. Bennedsen
et al. (2007), Pérez-González (2006) and Vilallonga and Amit (2006) also
nd that CEO family succession leads to a signicant drop in family rm
performance displaying the ine¢ ciencies caused by favoritism in succession
and promotion politics.2
While the existence and negative inuence of favoritism is well docu-
mented, possible remedies for it are less intensely studied. One important
exception is Bandiera et al. (2009) who analyze an exogenous change from a
xed wage to a bonus scheme for supervisors in a large agricultural company.
Under xed wages managers favor socially connected workers by granting
them a stronger support which leads to a large productivity gap between
socially connected and socially unconnected workers. When supervisors re-
ceive a bonus based on workersoutput they reallocate their support towards
high ability workers, causing a signicant overall increase in productivity. In
this paper we show that higher powered managerial incentive pay also sub-
stantially a¤ects the quality of promotion decisions and we provide empirical
evidence based on a large and representative sample of rms.
Finally, by combining survey data on management practices with more
objective information across larger samples on di¤erent rms, our paper adds
to the emerging literature on investigating key issues in personnel economics
and the economics of organizations as for instance recently advocated in
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010).
2Two exceptions to these ndings are Sraer and Thesmar (2007) and Anderson and
Reeb (2003) who report a positive correlation between performance and the presence of
family CEOs.
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2.3 The Model
We consider a 3-stage model with a top manger M and two heterogeneous
agents i = A;B competing for a middle manger position. In the rst period,
agents choose an unobservable e¤ort level ei1 and produce outputs
si1 = ai + ei1 + "i1 (2.1)
where ai  N (ma; 2a=2) denotes agent is time invariant and unknown abil-
ity. The error term is also normally distributed with "i1  N (0; 2"=2). We
assume ai and "i1 to be independent and their distributions to be common
knowledge. Providing e¤ort yields e¤ort costs c
2
e2i . All players are risk neu-
tral. Period 1 prot is given by
1 = sA1 + sB1:
In period 2 top manager M observes performance signals si1 and chooses
which agent  2 fA;Bg is to be promoted to the middle manager position.
The promoted agent receives a wage increase w.
In period 3, agents choose their e¤ort level ei3, again produce si3 = ai +
ei3 + "i3 and generate company prot
3 = k  s3 + s 3 (2.2)
where s3 and s 3 are the outputs of the promoted and non-promoted agent.
With k > 1, we assume a middle managers performance to have larger
impact on company prot as the non-promoted agent.
The agentsutilities are simply the sum of their expected wages minus
their e¤ort costs. They receive no x wage component. Ms wage is given
by  +   (1 +3) where  is a xed wage and  measures the extent of
prot sharing. Finally, we assume that the top manager may personally like
the two agents to a di¤erent extent and therefore favor one over the other.
Similar to Prendergast and Topel (1996) and Prendergast (2002) she receives
a utility from favoritism of  w such that the wage increase w awarded
11
to the promoted agent is weighted with a preference parameter i. Hence,
her overall utility is
+   (1 +3) +  w:
We assume Ms discount factor to be 1 and i to be known by all players.
Furthermore, we take all compensation parameters with the exception of 
as given and focus on the connection between  and promotion decisions.
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
We now determine the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. In the absence of in-
centives, agents choose zero e¤ort in stage 3 and produce according to their
ability (see equation 2.2). In stage 2 top manager Ms conditional expected
utility for  2 fA;Bg depends on the agentsperiod 1 performance signals
sA1 and sB1 and is given by
VM (; sA1; sB1) = E

+   3 +  w j sA1; sB1

= + k  E [a j s1] +   E [a  j s 1] +  w:
Hence, M promotes agent A if VM (A; sA1; sB1)  VM (B; sA1; sB1) or
E [aA j sA1]  E [aB j sB1]   w
 (k   1) (2.3)
where  = B   A. In the absence of favoritism ( = 0) the rhs in
equation 2.3 is zero. In this case, Ms decision is solely driven by her expec-
tations about agentsabilities and the agent who is expected to be more able
gets promoted. The model then basically boils down to a standard Lazear
and Rosen (1981) type tournament model. Furthermore, pure ability based
promotion decisions maximize the companys third period prots in equa-
tion 2.2. If, however, favoritism matters, M gains additional utility from
promoting the favored agent. The more M favors an agent, the more likely
her promotion decision will not coincide with the prot maximizing decision.
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Furthermore, the higher  the smaller this distortion will be which leads to
the rst result:
Proposition 1 Higher powered incentive schemes reduce the managers in-
clination to follow her private preferences in the promotion decision.
Anticipating Ms decision in 2.3 agent As expected utility is given by
UA = Pr

E [aA j sA1]  E [aB j sB1]   w
 (k   1)

w   c
2
e2A1:
The conditional expectation about agent is ability is given by
E [ai j si1] = ma + 
2
a
2a + 
2
"
(ai + ei + "i1  ma   bei1) (2.4)
where bei1 denotes Ms belief about agent is equilibrium e¤ort choice.3 Sub-
stituting Ms conditional expectation into agentsobjective function yields
EUA = 
0@eA1   eB1   beA1 + beB1   w(k 1) 2a+2"2ap
2a + 
2
"
1Aw   c
2
e2A1
where  () is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. If an internal
equilibrium exists4, the agentsoptimal symmetric e¤ort choices are therefore
given by
eA;B =
w
c
p
2 (2a + 
2
")
exp

  
2 w2
22 (k   1)2
(2a + 
2
")
4a

: (2.5)
From this equation we directly obtain our second result:
Proposition 2 The agents equilibrium e¤ort levels are strictly decreasing
in the degree of favoritism jj and strictly increasing in the power of man-
agerial incentives .
3For the conditional expectation of normally distributed random variables see for in-
stance DeGroot (1970) p. 167.
4Existence can be assured when c is su¢ ciently large as the objective functions are
then strictly concave.
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Favoritism towards subordinates does not only reduce future prots as
on average less able agents are promoted. It also lowers ex-ante prots as
the agents anticipate that promotion decisions are not entirely driven by per-
formance considerations. This mechanism weakens the link between perfor-
mance and rewards and, in turn, makes exerting high e¤orts less attractive.
To illustrate the relationship between managerial incentives and promo-
tion quality we derive the ex-ante probability of promoting the more able
agent. Assume w.l.o.g. that  > 0; i.e., agent B is favored by M . The
likelihood that indeed the agent is promoted who is expected to be more able
is given by
1  Pr

0 < Ean [aA j sA1]  Ean [aB j sB1] <  w
 (k   1)

:
Inserting the conditional expectation (2.4) and simplifying yields that in
equilibrium this probability is equal to
3
2
  Pr

a+" <
2a + 
2
"
2a
 w
 (k   1)

:
As from an ex-ante perspective a+" is normally distributed with mean
0 and variance 22a + 2
2
" this probability is
3
2
  

1
22a
 w
 (k   1)

: (2.6)
The function is monotonically increasing in  but becomes at if  is su¢ -
ciently large.5 Figure 2.1 displays plots of function (2.6) for di¤erent degrees
of favoritism .6 Note that even very low powered incentive schemes su¢ ce
to generate substantial e¢ ciency gains when  is not too large. Of course,
when the impact of favoritism is large, higher values of  become necessary
to reduce the bias.
5Note that lim!1
@

3
2 

1
22a
w
(k 1)

@ = 0.
6Figure 2.1 shows graphs for w = 10; k = 3 and 2a = 5 and  = 0:1; 0:2; or 0:4.
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Figure 2.1: Probability that more able agents are promoted as a function of
. Graphs for  = 0:1 (solid),  = 0:2 (dashed) and  = 0:4 (dotted).
2.5 Data and Hypotheses
Our data source is a 2006 employer-employee matched survey conducted by
the Great Place to Work Institute and the German Federal Ministry of Labor
and Social A¤airs. The dataset is a representative sample of 305 German
rms employing a minimum of 20 workers. For each rm the management
provided company-level information on organizational facts, strategic goals
and corporate values as well as on various management practices and the
structure of compensation. Most of this information is provided separately
for managers and workers in each rm.7
In addition to this rm-level information, a representative employee-
survey was conducted in each sampled rm yielding over 36,000 observations
in total. The employee survey includes 58 standardized items to be answered
on a 5-point Likert scale which are designed to measure the level of trust,
pride, and cooperation within rms. More precisely the items focus on the
7More specically, answers were provided for employees in supervisory function and
the largest group of nonmanagerial employees, i.e. the core occupational group.
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relationship among employees, between employees and management, and on
the work environment.
Due to the random sampling process the 305 rms are almost evenly
spread across the di¤erent industries in Germany. The majority of the sam-
pled rms are small or medium sized. While the average number of employees
is 430, the median lies at 157. However, roughly 10% of the rms employ
more than 1,000 workers including the largest rm in the sample with 14,000
workers.
The management survey includes detailed information on the structure of
incentive pay in each rm. Each management representative stated whether
wages for managers and workers in the corresponding rm include a perfor-
mance related pay component. For both, managers and workers, we know
the share of the average wage (in %) determined by performance related pay
(henceforth PRP).8
Figure 2.2 gives a descriptive overview of PRP usage across industries
displaying the share of rms using PRP for managers and workers. While
only less than half of all sampled rms use variable pay components for
workers, the use of manager PRP varies from only 16% in the public sector
to 90% in nancial services. In total 168 out of 296 (57%) rms use PRP for
their managers.9
In addition to the information on the strength of performance related pay
components, the management survey also includes information on whether
there is a gain sharing scheme or managers hold company assets. In contrast
to manager PRP, this information is only provided as a binary variable which
we label as Manager Gain Sharing. 36 out of 295 (12%) rms used such gain
sharing plans for their managers. Together with manager PRP this variable
will serve as our main independent variable in the upcoming analysis.10
8To be precise, the items are Does the compensation of the employees encompass a
performance-based part? (yes/no)and How big is the variable share on average (in %)
and What are the shares of the following measures of success in this variable compensation
component? (company success, success of the organizational unit (team, working group),
personal performance, or other). It is important to note that this does not refer to the
actual payments in the studied year but the general structure of the compensation scheme.
99 out of the 305 sampled rms did not provide information on PRP.
10Note that manager PRP and manager gain sharing are two di¤erent ways of tying man-
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Figure 2.2: Utilization of Performance related Pay across German Industries
Typically, it is very hard to assess the quality of promotion decisions
empirically. One reason is that the counterfactual, i.e., the performance of
the non-promoted employees on the considered position is never observable.
Furthermore, personnel records such as personal assessments or employees
past performances (data that are usually hard to obtain) may not reveal
which candidate best meets the requirements for the specic position to be
lled. However, employees in a company are in a good position to judge
whether indeed the best people are promoted.
Complementing the rm level information provided by the management,
we therefore exploit the employee surveys conducted in each rm to mea-
sure the quality of promotion decisions.11 The survey item Promotions go
to those who best deserve themmeasures the perceived promotion quality
agerspay to company performance. The two variables show only a weak and insignicant
correlation of r = 0:07.
11In rms with less than 500 employees all employees were asked to participate. In
larger rms a representative 500-employee sample was drawn. For sampling details see
Hauser et al. (2008).
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within a rm. The item is to be answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 almost always untrueto 5 almost always trueand refers to the
company as a whole.
Figure 2.3 shows the distributions of the proportion of employees per
rm who agree with the statement Promotions go to those who best deserve
them(by having chosen a 4 or a 5 (Top Boxes) on the Likert scale). The up-
per (lower) panel illustrates the distribution for rms without (with) manger
PRP.12 According to the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney rank-sum test the data
do not stem from the same distribution (p = 0:000). The descriptive evi-
dence for rms with and without manager gain sharing plans in gure 2.4
looks similar. Again we can reject the null hypothesis that data come from
the same distribution (p = 0:000). These patterns of empirical distributions
are in line with our theoretical prediction, suggesting that the quality of pro-
motion decisions is indeed higher when rms provide monetary incentives for
their managers.
In section 2.6 we test this prediction by running ordered probit regres-
sions. The existence and strength of managerspay for performance and the
existence of gain sharing plans are our main explanatory variables. In section
2.6.2 we address rm heterogeneity by using detailed rm-level information
about human resource and management practices and demographic informa-
tion. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 in the Appendix display descriptive statistics for all
variables on the rm and individual level.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Managerial Incentives and Favoritism
In this section we estimate the relation between managerial incentives and our
measure of promotion quality controlling for key rm and employee charac-
teristics. Since employees stem from 305 rms, we cluster the standard errors
on rm level. The results of the ordered probit regression are presented in
12Since employeesanswers are not independent, we aggregate on rm level to report
descriptive statistics.
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table 2.1. Starting with a basic model we successively add further controls.
In column 1 we regress the survey item on a dummy indicating whether a
rm provides performance related pay to its managers and a set of stan-
dard rm controls including two rm size dummies, 11 industry dummies,
and a dummy indicating whether a rm has established a works council.13
Manager PRP is positively related to the measure of promotion quality, so
employees in rms with manager PRP are signicantly more likely to state
a very strong agreement with the item Promotions go to those who best
deserve them and signicantly less likely to state a strong disagreement.
In column 2 we alternatively use the presence of a manager gain sharing
plan as explanatory variable and again nd a highly signicant and positive
coe¢ cient. Moreover, when including both explaining variables in specica-
tion (3), coe¢ cients remain stable in statistical signicance, indicating that
both are separately related to the quality of promotion decisions, i.e., rms
which use both instruments have a higher perceived quality of promotions as
compared to rms which use only one of them.14
13According to German law, rms are obliged to set up a works council when this is
demanded by employees.
14There is no detectable interaction e¤ect between manager PRP and manager gain
sharing when an interaction term is included.
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In specication (4) we control for the socioeconomic background (tenure,
age, and education) and the percentage of managerial positions lled inter-
nally (Internal Sta¢ ng), since higher internal sta¢ ng quotas may be corre-
lated with our explaining variables and cause an upward bias in the respec-
tive answers. While we see that manager gain sharing plans as well as higher
internal sta¢ ng quotas are also signicantly positively related to higher pro-
motion quality, the coe¢ cient of our main variables of interest remains stable
and highly signicant. Table 2.2 shows the ordered probit marginal e¤ects
of the estimates from column 1-4 in table 2.1. The bottom panel in table 2.2
shows that employees in rms which apply manager PRP, are 2.4% (5.9%)
more likely to choose 5 (4) on the Likert scale and are less likely to make
negative statements (choose 1 or 2). Similar, employees in rms with man-
agerial gain sharing plans are 3.0% (5.8%) more likely to make the respective
statement.
To develop a more intuitive way for evaluating the economic signicance
of the relationship in question, we dichotomized the dependent variable and
created a dummy variable which has value 1 if an employee chooses one of
the two highest levels of agreement to the statement that promotions go to
those who best deserve them. We regress this dummy on the explanatory
variables from the specication in column 4 in table 2.1 in a simple binomial
probit regression model. Column 5 in table 2.1 shows the marginal e¤ects of
the binomial probit estimation.15 A worker is 8.3% more likely to agree that
promotions are based on merit if her rm uses manger PRP and a further
9.7% more likely when manager gain sharing is used.
But what does this increase in probability mean for a rm? To obtain an
additional economic interpretation we aggregate the data and run an OLS
regression on rm level with explanatory variables from table 2.1, column 1-4.
The percentage of employees who agree that promotions are based on merit
(i.e., ticking 4 or 5) serves as dependent variable. The results are shown in the
Appendix in table 2.7. In rms with manager PRP (manager gain sharing
plan) 5.7% (6.7%) more employees have a positive opinion about their rms
15Running linear models on the discrete outcome variable, as considered by Angrist and
Pischke (2009), yields similar results.
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promotion practice.16 The predicted fraction of employees agreeing to that
statement at the mean of all other explanatory variables is equal to 30.7%
(33.3%) when there is no manager PRP (gain sharing). This rate increases to
36.4% (40%) when manager PRP (gain sharing) is applied. Overall, in rms
which apply one or both instruments, substantially more employees believe
that promotions are based on merit.
In the next step we consider the e¤ect of the strength of managerial incen-
tives. The key independent variable is now the average percentage of manager
PRP. The theoretical model in section 2.3 predicts that higher managerial
incentives should lead to less favoritism. However, as indicated by gure 2.1,
for higher manager PRP, additional gains in promotion quality should decline
in the size of manager PRP. For instance, when preferences for favoritism are
not too strong, already weak managerial incentives lead to good promotion
decisions. Any further increase in managerial incentives may provide only
little further improvement.
In table 2.3 we therefore regress our main dependent variable on the
strength of manager PRP (column 1 & 2). In column 3 we include a squared
term, while column 4 includes 3 interval dummies for the strength of manager
PRP with the reference category being rms without manager PRP.
The coe¢ cients in columns 1 & 2 in table 2.3 again indicate a positive
relationship between the two incentives schemes and the likelihood of a pos-
itive statement. The negative and signicant square term in column 3 and
4 indeed reveals decreasing returns to performance pay. In column 5 we use
dummies for rms which use weak (1%-10%), moderate (11%-20%) or strong
(>20%) manager PRP, where rms without managerial PRP serve as base
category. The three dummy coe¢ cients are all statistically signicant and
similar in size. Promotion quality in rms with moderate or high managerial
incentives is higher than in rms from the base category but as high as in
rms with low incentives.17 In sum, the results in table 2.3 t the theoretical
prediction that even weak incentives are associated with substantially higher
16Ticking 4 or 5 on the Likert scale we describe as positive, ticking 1 or 2 we describe
as negative judgement.
17Note that the coe¢ cients of the interval dummies are not signicantly di¤erent from
one another.
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Dependent Variable "Promotions go to those who best deserve them"
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Manager PRP (%) 0.0045** 0.0119*** 0.0109**
(0.0022) (0.0045) (0.0044)
Manager PRP2 (%) -0.00012** -0.00011*
(6.11e-05) (6.08e-05)
Manager PRP 1-10% 0.256***
(0.0649)
Manager PRP 11-20% 0.240***
(0.0700)
Manager PRP > 20% 0.199**
(0.0914)
Manager Gain S. 0.217** 0.312** 0.281*** 0.231***
(0.0958) (0.0911) (0.0917) (0.0770)
Internal Sta¢ ng (%) 0.0010 0.0011
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Works Council -0.147*** -0.165*** -0.138*** -0.130*** -0.150***
(0.0554) (0.0526) (0.0518) (0.0503) (0.0462)
Socioeconomics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,948 28,373 27,948 25,840 25,840
Clusters (Firms) 288 294 288 271 271
Chi2 458.2 431.2 499.0 851.6 922.9
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, clustered standard errors on rm level in parentheses
Ordered Probit regression, further controls: 2 rm size dummies and 11 industry dummies
Reference category: 0-99 employee rm in the food industry
Reference category in model (4): Firms without manager PRP
Socioeconomics include tenure, sex, occupational status, job type (blue collar, white collar)
Table 2.3: The Relationship between Managerial Incentives and Favoritism
- Quadratic and Nonparametric Models
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promotion quality.
2.6.2 Robustness and Potentially Omitted Variables
Of course it is important to discuss to what extent the observations reported
in the above may be due to unobserved rm heterogeneity rather than a
causal relationship between incentive schemes and promotion quality. A com-
peting non-causal explanation for our cross sectional evidence might be that
the managements willingness to use modern Human Resource Management
practices causes better promotion quality, which in turn is correlated with
our explanatory variables. For example, a rm may have invested more in
setting up a professional HR department which at the same time advocates
the use of PRP and performance appraisal procedures that help to promote
the most able employees. Or, a rm with higher growth rates may have a
higher willingness to share prots with managers and at the same time pro-
vides more promotion opportunities which leads the workforce to conclude
that many capable employees can be promoted. While our dataset does not
provide a variable that is suitable in a sensible manner as an instrument in an
IV regression (all possible candidates violate the exclusion restriction with-
out imposing untenable assumptions), we have rich information on other HR
practices used by the rms. By controlling for management and HR practices
we can provide strong evidence that rules out many potential non-causal in-
terpretations of the results described in the above. The key advantage of our
data is that we have two combined data sources and, in a narrow sense, the
management practices are exogenous when viewed from the perspective of
an individual employee whose perceptions we measure and use as dependent
variable.
We extend the specication from column 4 in table 2.1 by stepwise adding
further controls in table 2.4. In column 1 we add a dummy for the presence of
performance related pay for non-managerial employees and expect a positive
sign, since worker PRP needs a system to evaluate performance and this may
induce higher promotion quality. However, worker PRP is not correlated
with perceived promotion quality. Moreover, the coe¢ cients for manager
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Dependent Variable "Promotions go to those who best deserve them"
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Manager PRP 0.212*** 0.188** 0.187** 0.149** 0.161**
(0.0739) (0.0784) (0.0762) (0.0658) (0.0651)
Manager Gain S. 0.227*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.275*** 0.265***
(0.0769) (0.0770) (0.0770) (0.0727) (0.0770)
Worker PRP 0.0574 0.0669 0.0678 0.0723 0.0416
(0.0618) (0.0626) (0.0618) (0.0581) (0.0594)
Upsize 0.122** 0.122** 0.115** 0.0894*
(0.0566) (0.0562) (0.0521) (0.0505)
Downsize 0.00743 0.00799 -0.00236 0.0361
(0.0566) (0.0567) (0.0611) (0.0561)
Female Career -0.00902 -0.0389 -0.0460
(0.0712) (0.0737) (0.0709)
Job Rotation 0.108** 0.135***
(0.0495) (0.0498)
High Wage 0.0339
(0.0461)
Low Wage -0.179
(0.115)
Observations 25,917 25,917 25,917 23,044 22,279
Clusters (Firms) 274 274 274 252 235
Chi2 933.3 975.6 1003.9 1002.7 1322.8
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered standard errors in parentheses
Ordered Probit regression, further controls: 2 rm size dummies and 11
industry dummies. Socioeconomics include tenure, sex, occupational status,
and job type (blue collar, white collar). Reference category: full-time employee
in a small rm (0-99 employees) in the food industry
Table 2.4: The Relationship between Managerial Incentives and Favoritism
- Controls I
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PRP and manager gain sharing are basically una¤ected. If our results were
largely driven by the general willingness to use modern HR practices we
should observe a substantial drop in the coe¢ cients which is not the case.
In the next step we add information on whether the rm up- or downsized
within the last 3 years. In particular, both promotion opportunities and the
willingness to share prots may increase in rms with high growth rates. The
dummy Upsize (Downsize) equals 1 if the number of employees increased
(decreased) by more than 5% in the last 3 years. As can be seen in column
(2) Upsize is positively correlated with the promotion quality, though this
e¤ect vanishes in the following richer specications. Again the coe¢ cients for
manager PRP and gain sharing are hardly a¤ected. We additionally control
for the existence of a specic woman career plan and job rotation program,
which both potentially a¤ect promotion decisions and promotion quality.
Ortega (2001), Arya and Mittendorf (2004) and Eriksson and Ortega (2006)
argue that rms learn about employeesproductivity and specic capabilities
via job rotation and that employer learning increases promotion quality. The
e¤ect of woman career plans is ambiguous. The selective promotion of high
ability women might increase the promotion quality, but male employees may
feel discriminated and thus perceive a lower promotion quality. In column (3)
and (4) we add dummies for both measures. Only job rotation is positively
correlated with our measure of promotion quality. In column (5) we add
dummies for companies paying above or below the respective union wages,
where companies with above union wages show higher perceived promotion
quality.
We add further controls in specications reported in table 2.8 in the
Appendix. For instance, we control for the average number of days of further
employee training as this should be a suitable proxy for a rms willingness
to invest in human resources (which may a¤ect promotion quality and the
willingness to share prots). As several rms did not report this key gure
the number of observations drops substantially. However, it is interesting
to note that the coe¢ cients for manager PRP and gain sharing increase
substantially in size and remain highly signicant. Finally, we control for the
general work satisfaction of employees as higher perceived promotion quality
28
may be simply due to higher work satisfaction. As can be seen in column
(8), work satisfaction is indeed highly correlated with promotion quality, but
does not a¤ect the association between manager PRP or gain sharing and
perceived promotion quality.
2.7 Conclusion
When performance is not perfectly observable promotion decisions are fre-
quently based on subjective performance evaluations. If managers have per-
sonal preferences for certain workers they have an incentive to distort perfor-
mance ratings which promotes favored workers rather than most able workers.
We theoretically show that favoritism can reduce company prots not only
by putting the wrong people into management positions but also by reducing
incentives for workers to exert e¤ort in promotion tournaments. Managerial
incentives can constrain favoritism in promotion decisions by realigning man-
agersand rms interest and even rather weak managerial incentives may
generate strong e¢ ciency gains.
We empirically tested the theoretical prediction using an unique represen-
tative matched employer-employee dataset. The empirical analysis conrms
our theoretical result as promotion quality is signicantly higher in rms in
which managers receive performance related pay or participate in gain shar-
ing plans. Indeed this higher perceived quality of promotion decisions should
translate in higher company performance as, not only the probability that
the best and not the best liked employees are promoted increases, but also
because stronger merit-based promotions should lead to a more motivated
workforce.
29
2.8 Appendix to Chapter 2
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Dependent Variable "Promotions go to those who best deserve them"
(1) (2) (3)
Manager PRP 0.165** 0.320*** 0.315***
(0.0651) (0.0860) (0.0818)
Manager Gain Sharing 0.264*** 0.378*** 0.362***
(0.0772) (0.0887) (0.0960)
Upsize 0.0905* 0.0904* 0.0592
(0.0505) (0.0532) (0.0535)
Downsize 0.0347 -0.00614 -0.0224
(0.0554) (0.0734) (0.0663)
Job Rotation 0.134*** 0.149*** 0.139**
(0.0497) (0.0569) (0.0556)
High Wage 0.0345 0.0398 0.0206
(0.0458) (0.0580) (0.0565)
Low Wage -0.182 -0.784*** -0.631***
(0.117) (0.0944) (0.0960)
Recruiting -0.0149 -0.0314 -0.0124
(0.0436) (0.0484) (0.0481)
Further Training 0.000526 0.000288
(0.000453) (0.000432)
Work Satisfaction 0.306***
(0.0122)
Observations 22,279 13,571 12,724
Chi2 1301.6 1882.7 2397.9
Clusters (Firms) 235 139 139
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 0.07
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered standard errors on rm level in parentheses
Ordered Probit regression, Further controls: 2 rm size dummies,
11 industry dummies, works council, worker PRP, female career
Socioeconomics include tenure, sex, occupational status, education
Table 2.8: The Relationship between Managerial Incentives and Favoritism
- Controls II
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Chapter 3
When Higher Prizes Lead to
Lower E¤orts - The Impact of
Favoritism in Tournaments1
3.1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Lazear and Rosen (1981), numerous pa-
pers have explored the incentive e¤ects of tournaments. One of the most
prominent results in the literature is that higher tournament prizes lead to
higher e¤orts. A key assumption in most of these tournament models is that
the agent with the highest output always wins the tournament. However, in
reality, tournament outcomes are often based on subjective decisions by in-
dividuals. For instance, in organizations managers decide upon promotions.
Or in sports contests, referees or judges either directly determine the winner
or make decisions which crucially a¤ect the tournament outcome. In these
settings not only output, but also personal preferences towards the agents
may a¤ect the choice of the winner. We show in a simple extension of the
standard Lazear/Rosen framework that the existence of favoritism can re-
verse the relationship between the tournament prize and e¤ort choices. The
e¤ect of higher prizes are then twofold: On the one hand, higher prizes make
1This chapter is based upon Herbertz and Sliwka (2011).
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it still more attractive to win. But on the other hand there are higher incen-
tives for a biased evaluator to pick her favorite agent and as the tournament
becomes more uneven incentives are reduced. We show that the latter e¤ect
always dominates the former when prizes are beyond a certain threshold,
such that e¤orts then are strictly decreasing in the prize spread.
Prendergast and Topel (1996) nd that subjective evaluation distortion
induced by favoritism leads to worse job allocation and lower optimal incen-
tives for employees. Higher incentives for the agents increase the supervisors
inclination to distort evaluations. Prendergast (2002) extends this approach
by showing that favoritism in subjective performance evaluations can lead
to a reverse relationship of risk and incentives. In a risky environment, a
supervisors evaluation is noisy and has little weight since it bears fewer in-
formation. Hence, favoritism becomes less important and optimal incentives
are higher than in less risky environments. Berger et al. (2011) show, that
favoritism in Lazear/Rosen job promotion tournaments leads to lower e¤orts
and lower promotion quality. This e¤ect can be mitigated by proper man-
agerial incentives. We use a similar model as Berger et al. (2011) to derive
conditions under which higher tournament prizes lead to lower e¤orts.
3.2 The Model
Consider a model with a supervisor S and two agents i = A;B who compete
in a tournament. The agents choose an unobservable e¤ort level ei at costs
c (ei) and produce outputs
si = ai + ei + "i
where ai  N (ma; 2a) denotes agent is unknown ability. The error term is
also normally distributed with "i  N (0; 2"). We assume ai and "i to be
independent and their distributions to be common knowledge. All players
are risk neutral. After the agents have exerted their e¤orts the supervisor S
observes the unveriable performance signals si and picks the winner of the
tournament  2 fA;Bg. The winning agent receives a tournament prize P .
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The supervisor benets when the more able agent wins the tournament.
For instance, a manager earns more when picking the more able candidate
for a promotion as prots are higher, or the reputation of a judge in a sport
contest is a¤ected by the future performance of the winner. But the supervi-
sor also cares for the well-being of the agents and does so to a di¤erent extent
for the two agents. Similar to Prendergast and Topel (1996) or Prendergast
(2002) we assume that these preferences are measured by a parameter i
indicating how much the supervisor cares for an agent i. The supervisors
overall utility is thus a function of the chosen winner  and is given by
V () = k  a +   P .
Hence, k measures the degree of alignment, i.e., the higher k the higher are
the incentives for the supervisor to indeed pick the agent she believes to be
more able. But when the preference parameters i di¤er strongly she may
favor the agent whom she likes more even when this comes along with a lower
expected ability of the winner.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
We now determine the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game described
above. The supervisor will declare that agent A is the winner when
E [V (A)j sA] > E [V (B)j sB],
E [aAj sA]  E [aBj sB] > B  P
k
(3.1)
where B = B   A. Hence, if agent B is favored (i.e., B > 0) then
A wins the tournament only if she is believed to be su¢ ciently more able
than agent B. In the absence of favoritism (B = 0) the right hand side
in equation 3.1 is zero. In this case, Ss decision is solely driven by her
expectations about agentsabilities and the agent who is expected to be more
able is chosen. Hence, the model boils down to a standard Lazear and Rosen
(1981) type tournament. If, however, favoritism matters, S gains additional
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utility from picking the favored agent. The more S favors an agent, the more
likely it is that her decision will not coincide with the ability maximizing
decision. The higher k the smaller is this distortion.
Now we can analyze how the supervisors decision depends on actual
performance outcomes. The conditional expectation on As ability is given
by
E [aAj sA] = ma + 
2
a
2a + 
2
"
(aA + eA + "A  ma   e^A) (3.2)
where e^A1 denotes Ss belief about agent As equilibrium e¤ort choice.2
Hence, agent A will be promoted if
ma +
2a
2a + 
2
"
(sA  ma   e^A) ma   
2
a
2a + 
2
"
(sB  ma   e^B) > B  P
k
:
This directly leads to the following result:
Lemma 1 The supervisor picks agent A as the winner of the tournament if
and only if
sA   sB > 
2
a + 
2
"
2a
B  P
k
+ e^A   e^B:
Even at identical e¤ort levels, A wins the tournament only if she outper-
forms B with a su¢ ciently large margin when B is favored by the supervisor.
Both competitors take the distortion into account when they choose their ef-
forts. Anticipating Ss decision agent As expected utility is given by
Pr

aA + eA + "A   aB   e^B   "B > 
2
a + 
2
"
2a
B  P
k
+ e^A   e^B

P   c (eA)
= Pr

eA   e^A   
2
a + 
2
"
2a
B  P
k
> aB   aA + "B   "A

P   c (eA) :
As aB   aA + "B   "A is a normally distributed random variable with mean
2For the conditional expectation of normally distributed random variables see for in-
stance DeGroot (1970) p. 167.
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0 and variance 2 (2a + 
2
") this is equal to

0@eA   e^A   2a+2"2a B Pkp
2 (2a + 
2
")
1AP   c (eA)
where  () is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. Suppose for
the moment that an internal pure strategy equilibrium exists. If this is the
case, the agentsoptimal e¤ort choices are characterized by the rst order
condition

0@eA   e^A   2a+2"2a BPkp
2 (2a + 
2
")
1A 1p
2 (2a + 
2
")
P   c0 (eA) = 0: (3.3)
In equilibrium eA = e^A and as the left hand side is equal for A and B we
can show the following result:
Proposition 1 If Pp
8(2a+
2
")
exp
  1
2

< infe c
00 (e) there is a unique pure
strategy equilibrium in which both agents exert e¤ort level
e = c 1
 

 
 
r
1
2
2a+
2
"
4a
BP
k
!
Pp
2 (2a + 
2
")
!
(3.4)
and the supervisor declares that agent A is the winner if sA sB > 2a+2"2a
B P
k
.
Proof: See the appendix.
Thus, as in a standard Lazear/Rosen type tournament a symmetric equi-
librium exists if the cost functions are su¢ ciently convex.3 It is straightfor-
ward to see that in this equilibrium, the e¤orts are decreasing in the degree of
favoritism B as  (x) is symmetric and single peaked at 0. This is the well
known result that e¤orts are lower in asymmetric tournaments. However, the
e¤ect of the tournament prize is less evident as there are two countervailing
e¤ects: On the one hand winning is more attractive for higher values of P ,
but on the other hand, the tournament becomes less fair the higher P and
3Compare Lazear and Rosen (1981), p. 845, or Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988), p.
871.
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this has a negative e¤ect on incentives. Taking the rst derivative of the
equilibrium e¤ort (3.4) we obtain that @e
@P
> 0 is equivalent to
 0

 
q
2a+
2
"
24a
BP
k
q
2a+
2
"
24a
BP
k
+ 

 
q
2a+
2
"
24a
BP
k

> 0:
Using that for normally distributed random variables 0 (x) =  x (x)
this simplies to P 2 < 2 
4
a
2a+
2
"
k2
2B
and we obtain our key result:
Proposition 2 Too high tournament prizes lead to a reduction of the agents
e¤orts: there is a threshold value P =
q
24a
2a+
2
"
kp
2B
for P such that the
equilibrium e¤ort is strictly decreasing in P for P > P . The threshold P is
strictly increasing in the degree of alignment k and strictly decreasing in the
degree of favoritism B.
If the tournament prize is high, much is at stake for the agents and
the supervisor. When the supervisor favors one of them, the temptation
becomes larger to distort the choice of a winner if the prize is high. The
supervisor will still pick the agent with the higher performance, if this agent
has outperformed the favored competitor to a su¢ ciently high degree. But
this margin is increasing in the tournament prize. This in turn reduces the
e¤ort incentives for both the advantaged and the disadvantaged agent. For
su¢ ciently high tournament prizes this distortion e¤ect always outweighs
the direct incentive e¤ect as both agents will anticipate that the non-favored
agent will have little chances to win.
If 2" is high, the signal becomes less valuable in estimating agents abil-
ity and favoritism becomes more important in the supervisors promotion
decision. Hence, P decreases in 2". This nding di¤ers from Prendergast
(2002) who nds that a risky environment reduces distortions by favoritism
in subjective evaluations. In this setting, signal noise reduces the supervisors
weight in performance evaluation and hence limits the potential favoritism
by the supervisor. In our model the signal noise 2" does not reduce the im-
portance of the supervisors evaluation, but the importance of an observed
di¤erence in signals for the supervisors promotion decision. If the signals
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bear less information about the agentsabilities, personal preferences become
more important in the promotion decision.
On the other hand if ability noise 2a is high, signals carry more informa-
tion, since their uctuations are more likely due to ability di¤erences than to
noise. If signals become more important for promotions, agents have stronger
incentives to provide e¤ort for increasing their performance signal. Hence P
increases in 2a.
3.4 Conclusion
We show that favoritism in tournaments can lead to a reversed relationship
between the tournament prize and equilibrium e¤orts. The higher the prize,
the less likely it is that a supervisor will promote the more able agent, because
more is at stake for her personal favorite. Large stakes are common in sports,
but also in promotion tournaments for well paid jobs, such as executive po-
sitions. Especially in the latter, large prizes are accompanied by subjective
evaluations and social ties which are crucial for CEO appointments. If it
is not possible to eliminate subjectivity in tournaments, tournament prizes
should not be too high for avoiding demotivation of competing agents.
41
3.5 Appendix to Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 1:
A su¢ cient condition for existence is that objective functions are strictly
concave. This is the case if the second derivative of the objective function is
negative for any e¤ort level eA
0
0@eA   e^A   2a+2"2a B Pkp
2 (2a + 
2
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1A 1
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we show that the lhs is bounded from above. To see that let y = eA   e^A  
2a+
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. The lhs becomes
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This function has two extreme points as its rst order condition is given by
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and hence to y2 = 2 (2a + 
2
"). The lhs in equation 3.6 is maximized at
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y =  p2 (2a + 2"). We obtain the maximum of
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:
Therefore, a pure strategy equilibrium always exists if
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Chapter 4
Social Ties, Incentives, and
Adverse Selection1
4.1 Introduction
Employees in organizations are involved or confronted with social ties be-
tween colleagues, supervisors or fellow employees. For several decades, re-
searchers have been analyzing social networks predominantly nding positive
e¤ects, such as increased inner rm information ow, trust and productivity,
as well as reduced search costs in the labor market (see Granovetter (2005)
for a sociological and Rauch and Casella (2001) for an economical research
overview). However, strong relationships created by family ties, professional
long-term relationships, or fraternity membership, may also foster nepotis-
tic behavior, which creates disadvantages to the unrelated employees, the
so-called outsiders, and ine¢ cient decisions in rms.
In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether high ability outsiders
adversely select away from strong personal relationships and whether selec-
tion can be mitigated by e¢ ciency enhancing managerial incentives which
should weaken nepotistic behavior.
In the rst stage of the experiment, an unrelated agent can choose between
a riskless outside option and entering an organization with two unknown
1This chapter is based upon Herbertz (2011).
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players who are friends. This resembles the situation that applicants face
if they decide for or against working for an organization. If the outside
agent chooses to enter the organization, one of the two unknown players
distributes a pie among her friend and the outsider. Favoring her friend
yields an ine¢ cient allocation where the outside agent receives a slightly
lower payo¤ compared to her outside option. Favoring the outsider yields an
e¢ cient allocation where the outsider receives considerably more compared
to her outside option.
The results illustrate, that in the absence of managerial incentives, out-
siders fear nepotistic behavior by the manager and tend to choose the riskless
outside option. If the manager receives a variable payment, where her com-
pensation is tied to the sum of the total payo¤s, nepotism is costly. In
this case, the outside agent is more inclined to enter the organization, since
she hopes for an e¢ cient pie distribution. As it turns out, agents are right
in doing so, since managerial incentives indeed reduce managersfavorable
behavior towards their friends.
The experimental results suggest that strong personal relationships in or-
ganizations might come at the cost of the adverse selection of high ability
workers. Transparent managerial incentives help to avoid the adverse selec-
tion of high ability employees due to the crowding out of nepotistic behavior.
The paradigmatic case for organizations with strong social ties are family
rms which are very prominent in western stock markets. In most stud-
ies, the term family rm denotes rms where members of one family own
substantial rm shares and consequently play a major role in the board of
directors or even the board of management. 35% of S&P 500 rms are dom-
inated by families, where 15% of these rms are controlled by founders and
30% are controlled by the foundersdescendents CEOs (Anderson and Reeb
(2003)).2 One main research nding is the underperformance of rms headed
by descendent CEOs, compared to rms with professional or founder CEOs
(Bennedsen et al. (2007), Pérez-González (2006), Vilallonga and Amit (2006)
2Figures for European countries are similar in magnitude. See Sraer and Thesmar
(2007) for listed french companies, Bennedsen et al. (2007) for the case of Denmark and
Bertrand and Schoar (2006) for South America and Asia.
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and Morck et al. (2000)).3 The underperformance is generally explained by
the conjecture that the management ability of the descendent CEOs can be
expected to be lower, as the ability of the rst choice professional manager.
A complementary explanation for the underperformance of the descen-
dents CEOs is that high ability managers adversely select away from family
rms. Strong family a¢ liations may negatively a¤ect non-family managers
in family managed rms. Promotion tournaments and important decisions
are likely to be distorted in the favor of the family members. Poza et al.
(1997), for example, report, that non-family managers see their career path
and chances for senior positions as much worse than family members. Bloom
et al. (2011) report that reaching higher management positions in the Indian
textile industry is nearly impossible without a family a¢ liation.4 Anticipat-
ing these distortions, high ability managers may leave family rms or initially
select away from them into rms with better career perspectives. Firms with
lower average abilities in management or senior management positions are
more likely to underperform, compared to non-family rms.
This paper points out adverse selection e¤ects as a possible explanation
for rmsunderperformance and suggests transparent managerial incentives
for limiting the negative e¤ect of strong social ties. To date, these points
have been widely neglected in the family rms and favoritism literature.
The experimental design of this investigation builds upon Brandts and
Solà (2010), who study the reaction of outsiders on favoritism in organiza-
tions. In their design, a manager distributes a pie between a friend and a
third unknown player. After the distribution, the recipients give back an
arbitrary amount of money. The authors nd strong direct favoritism, such
that managers favor their friend in the pie sharing game, but do not nd ev-
idence for outsiders"revenge", i.e., disadvantaged players do not return less
than non-disadvantaged players. Brandts et al. (2006) use a similar game
structure for studying distribution decisions if the distributor is randomly
3This result is not totally unchallenged. Anderson and Reeb (2003) as well as Sraer
and Thesmar (2007) report positive correlations for some of their performance measures
and family CEOs (including descendent CEOs).
4For an overview of the relationship between family managers and non-family managers
see Chua et al. (2003).
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assigned or deliberately chosen by a player.
Bandiera et al. (2009) nd that even moderate social ties have an impact
on inner rm decisions and production e¢ ciency. In the absence of man-
agerial incentives, fruit pickers with a social connection to the supervising
manager have a 5% - 10% higher productivity than unconnected workers.
The gap is explained with nepotistic behavior by supervising managers. In
the presence of managerial incentives, the productivity gap between con-
nected and unconnected workers vanishes. Managers seem to allocate their
supporting e¤ort away from connected workers to high productivity workers.
This turns out to increase the total e¢ ciency of production.
This paper mimics the settings in Bandiera et al. (2009) but adds the
participation decisions of the unrelated employees. With this experimental
design, we study selection e¤ects induced by nepotistic behavior, which has
not been analyzed in the literature as of yet.
The next section introduces the experimental design, hypotheses, and
experimental procedures. Section 4.3 summarizes the results while section
4.4 eloborates upon the main ndings and policy implications.
4.2 Design and Hypotheses
In the experiment, 3-person groups play a 2-stage game. Figure 4.1 shows
the games structure and respective payo¤s. In the rst stage of the game,
Player C decides between entering the second stage with a pie sharing game
(choosing G) or taking an outside option (choosing O). The outside option
yields 10e for Player C, 8e for Player A and 4e for Player B.5 If C chooses
O, the game ends. If C chooses G, Player A distributes the shares of 3e
and 5e to Players C and B. The amount sent to Player C is tripled by the
experimenter. Choosing action E yields the e¢ cient allocation of 3e for
player B and 15e for Player C. Choosing I yields the ine¢ cient allocation
with 5e for B and 9e for C. In the baseline treatment, Player A gets 8e,
independent of her distribution decision.
5By the time of the experiment, 10e were equivalent to approximatly US $14.
47
Figure 4.1: A 2-Stage Pie Sharing Game
To study the e¤ect of social ties and incentives, we conduct Friend and
Incentive treatments. In the Friend treatments, Players A and B know each
other. During the recruitment process, 2-person groups were encouraged to
sign up for the experiment. Group members were randomly assigned to a
player type (A and B) and matched to an unknown Player C. The recruiting
procedure and group constellations were explained to all participants in the
respective treatment. In the Incentive treatments, Player A does not get a
xed payment for her distribution decision, but receives 50% of the payo¤s of
Player A and Player B, and thus, prots from choosing allocation E, rather
then the ine¢ cient allocation I. Table 4.1 displays the treatment names of
the resulting 2x2 design.
Compared to the outside option, Player C gains 5e under the e¢ cient
allocation and loses 1e under the ine¢ cient allocation. This insures that
Player C has a "natural" inclination to choose G, such that social ties in the
Friend treatments can have a negative e¤ect on Cs participation decision.
The experimental design mimics the situation in which a high ability
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applicant can enter an organization or take an alternative. When entering
the rm, she is dependent on the goodwill of her boss (Player A), who has
to decide whether to favor employee B or employee C. The multiplicative
factor for Player Cs payo¤ can be seen as a higher productivity of Player C.
Distributing the larger share to C (B) generates total payments of 26e (22e)
in treatments with no incentive payments and 27e (21e) in treatments with
incentive payments. Thus, favoring Player C always yields the e¢ cient, and
hence, desirable allocation from the organizations point of view.
Compensation Player A
Social Ties Fix Pay Incentive Pay
A and B are friends FriendFix FriendInc
Players are anonymous AnonymFix AnonymInc
Table 4.1: 2x2 Treatment Design
Hypotheses
In the baseline treatment AnonymFix, player A neither has a monetary
incentive to choose a certain allocation, nor a social inclination for favoring
one of the other players. However, in treatment FriendFix, Player A is related
to Player B, and hence more likely to favor Player B than in the baseline.
H1 (Favoritism): Player A more often chooses action I in Friend-
Fix than in AnonymFix.
The allocations in the baseline, resulting from actions E and I di¤er in
two respects. First, allocation E is the e¢ cient allocation, since the sum of
the playerspayments (8e, 3e and 15e) is 4e higher than under I. Second,
allocation I yields a much more equal distribution, since payments reach
from 7e to 9e. Hence, the decision in the AnonymFix treatment is prob-
ably driven by equity and/or e¢ ciency concerns. To detect favoritism, not
all A Players should choose the ine¢ cient allocation, due to strong equity
preferences. If participants would do so, social ties in the FriendFix treat-
ment could not increase the frequency of action I, as stated in H1. The
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discussion comparing e¢ ciency and inequity motives in allocation decisions
suggests that A Player decisions should be su¢ ciently heterogeneous to make
a favoritism e¤ect possible.6
In treatment FriendInc Player A bears a nancial loss when favoring her
friend. Choosing E yields a 29% higher income than choosing I.
H2 (Crowding out): Player A more often chooses action E in
FriendInc than in FriendFix.
Hypotheses H1 and H2 closely mimic the results in Bandiera et al. (2009),
where managers react to a change from a x to a incentive pay by following
economical, rather than social, motives. The predictions regarding Player
Cs behavior are based on the behavior of Player A in stage 2. Anticipating
H1, Player C is more reluctant to enter the pie sharing game in FriendFix.
H3 (Selection e¤ect): Player C more often chooses action G in
AnonymFix than in FriendFix.
Assuming that nancial incentives at least partially crowd out As fa-
voritism, Cs participation rate should increase in FriendInc.
H4 (Selection crowding out): Player C more often chooses G in
FriendInc than in FriendFix.
Experimental Procedures
We conducted 6 sessions between January and May of 2011 in the Cologne
Laboratory for Economic Research in Cologne, Germany. The total number
of participants was 117, yielding 39 independent group observations. A ses-
sion lasted for 50-60 minutes, with the average payo¤of 11.91e being slightly
higher than the hourly wage for typical student jobs. The experiment was
computer based and designed with zTree (Fischbacher (2007)). Because of
a relatively small target sample size, I used the strategy method (Selten
6See Engelmann and Strobel (2004), Fehr et al. (2006), Bolton and Ockenfels (2006),
and Engelmann and Strobel (2006) for the ambiguous discussion about social and e¢ ciency
preferences.
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(1967)). To minimize the chances of contact between group participants,
the campus was divided into two parts. In one part, we encouraged single
individuals, in the other part, 2-person groups to enroll for the experiment.
Player roles were assigned randomly in the laboratory. The scenario was
explained in neutral terms. You nd an English version of the instructions
in section 4.5.2.
4.3 Results
Table 4.2 presents Player As decision, the respective number of group obser-
vations and the proportions of e¢ cient allocations for each treatment. The
rate of e¢ cient allocation drops from 38% in AnonymFix to 0% in FriendFix.
This di¤erence is signicant at the 10% level (p = 0:07), and thus, supports
the favoritism hypothesis H1, that in the presence of social ties, Player A has
a strong tendency to favor her friend.7 The AnonymFix resembles a treat-
ment in Brandts and Solà (2010), in which Player A has to distribute 4e
and 6e between her friend and a high ability player who receives 3.25 times
of the transferred share. Similar to our results, 92% of all A-players choose
the ine¢ cient allocation, and thus, favor their friend.
AnonymFix FriendFix FriendInc AnonymInc
I 5 10 6 0
E 3 0 7 8
Observations 8 10 13 8
Proportion E 38% 0% 54% 100%
Table 4.2: Decision Player A
In the FriendInc treatment, 54% of all A-Players choose the e¢ cient allo-
cation. The di¤erence between FriendFix and FriendInc is highly signicant
(p = 0:007). This result reveals, that decision-makers react to nancial in-
centives by choosing the payo¤ maximizing action E, as supposed in H2,
7Due to the small sample size, test results are based on the two-tailed Fisher exact
test. Applying the Chi2 test yields always lower p-values. See table 4.4 and table 4.5 for
all between-treatments test results.
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more often. Interestingly, the results from AnonymFix and FriendInc do not
signicantly di¤er, so adopting nancial incentives in a setting with social
ties yields a similar decision pattern as xed payments without social ties.
The results from AnonymInc t the pattern. Compared to FriendInc, the
absence of social ties raises the proportion of e¢ cient allocations from 54%
to 100% (p = 0:026).
Table 4.3 summarizes Player Cs decision. As expected, the participation
rate in the baseline is high. Almost 90% of all C-Players enter the game, while
only 50% do so in FriendFix. The di¤erence between both treatments is not
signicant (p = 0:15), hence, we nd no support for H3. An explanation for
the non-nding is the low risk Player C faces when she enters the game. If
A chooses the ine¢ cient allocation, Player C only looses 1e, compared to
the outside option, but gains 5e if A chooses E. However, A Player decisions
yield an (ex post) expected payo¤of 9e for Player C, such that it was optimal
not to enter the game, but to choose the outside option. In FriendInc, 92%
of all C Players choose G. The di¤erence between FriendFix and FriendInc is
signicant with p = 0:052. As stated inH4, Player C anticipates As incentive
structure, hoping for a payo¤ maximizing Player A, and consequently, a
higher payo¤ by their own. Player C is right in doing so. The (ex post)
expected payo¤ is 12.24e, and thus, considerably higher than the outside
option payo¤.
AnonymFix FriendFix FriendInc AnonymInc
G 7 5 12 6
O 1 5 1 2
Observations 8 10 13 8
Proportion G 88% 50% 92% 75%
Table 4.3: Decision Player C
To measure the strength of social relationships between A and B in Friend
treatments, participants had to tick on a 10 point scale, from "I almost do
not know Player A(B)" to "I know Player A(B) very well". Figure 4.2 in the
Appendix illustrates the distribution of the answers. 40% of all participants
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tick 10, 25% ticked 9 and 35% tick 8 or less on the scale. Figure 4.3 shows
the distribution of the di¤erence between the answers of two friends. The
answers were highly correlated ( = 0:677 with p = 0:000). The data suggest
that participants were very familiar with each other. Concerning player As
behavior, one would expect a positive correlation between choosing I and
the friendship measure. The data show weak evidence for this conjecture.
Correlating As decision dummy (=1 if A chooses the ine¢ cient allocation
and =0 if A chooses the e¢ cient allocation) with the measure of friendship
yields a coe¢ cient of correlation of  = 0:334 with p = 0:119, and hence,
no signicant correlation. For only comparing groups with close and not so
close friends, we correlate the upper 40% with the lower 40% of A Player
answers. For this, the friendship measure was dichotomized in participants
who know Player B very well (ticking 10 on the scale) and who do not know
Player B very well (ticking 8 or less on the scale). Correlating the resulting
dummy with Player As decision yields a spearman coe¢ cient of correlation
of  = 0:426 with p = 0:088. Hence, A Players who know their friend
very well are less likely to choose the e¢ cient allocation, compared to those
who do not know their friend very well. Including the answers with 9 on
the scale does yield a positive but insignicant correlation. The fact that a
correlation coe¢ cient of  = 0:426 is close to being insignicant illustrates,
that signicance is hard to obtain with this sample size.
Similar to other experimental settings, where social ties are involved (Ab-
bink et al. (2006) and Brandts and Solà (2010)), the collusion of related
players might be an alternative explanation for the results presented above.
Since A and B sign up together for the experiment, they could implicitly or
explicitly adopt a prot sharing rule such that they equally split the total
earnings after the experiment. The sum of the payo¤s of Players A and B
in the FriendInc equals 12e for both distribution decisions, E and I. Hence,
from the monetary point of view and assuming a prot sharing rule, Player A
is indi¤erent between E and I. If Player A has a slight inclination to be nice
to Player C and the earnings are split anyway, she will take action E, but not
due to their own payo¤motives. If Player C adopts this mechanism, she will
more frequently participate in the FriendInc than in the AnonymInc treat-
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ment. Following this idea, the presented results were not due to the crowding
out of social ties by monetary incentives, but instead were due to the possi-
bility of a joint budget in the Friend treatments. Assuming close friends to
be more likely to adopt a sharing rule compared to not so close friends, we
would expect the following correlation: A Players with close friends should
more often choose the e¢ cient allocation, since they are more likely to equally
split their total prots than A Players with friends that are not as close. As
argued in the former passage, there is some evidence, that A Players who are
more closely related to their companion are less likely to choose the e¢ cient
allocation. In this light, the collusive behavior of friends seems unlikely.
After the experiment, the participants were asked for basic socioeconomic
information and used the Holt-Laury measure of risk for eliciting agents risk
preferences (Holt and Laury (2002)). According to the game setting, one
would expect more risk averse C Players to be less likely to enter the game
with an uncertain payo¤. But Playersrisk aversions or socioeconomic factors
were not found to be correlated with the decision behavior.
4.4 Conclusion
We introduced a 2-stage, 3-person pie sharing game to study the e¤ect of
strong social ties on distribution decisions and the participation decisions of
unrelated players. C Players had to decide whether to enter a second stage
and facing a pie sharing game, or taking an outside option. In the second
stage, A Players distributed 3e and 5e between C and B Players, where C
Players receive the tripled amount sent by A. B Players had no active role.
We study two treatment variations. In Friend treatments, Player A and B
were friends. In Incentive treatments, Player A has a monetary incentive for
sending 5e to Player C.
In the Friend treatments, decision-makers show favoritism by sending the
larger share of the pie to their friends. In the Incentive treatments, decision-
makers choose more often the e¢ cient distributions. C Players anticipate
Player As decision by proceeding more often to the pie sharing game in the
presence of incentives. Thus, in this experimental setting, nancial incentives
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decrease nepotistic behavior and crowd out selection e¤ects.
Applied to real world scenarios, the results discussed above can help to
clarify the role of incentives in two ways. First, nancial incentives in organi-
zations might reduce nepotistic behavior and lead to more e¢ cient decisions.
In real world terms, e¢ ciently distributing a pie could be interpreted as
promoting the more able, rather than the more liked, person, as in Berger
et al. (2011), or supporting high ability employees, rather than friends, as in
(Bandiera et al. (2009)). Second, and most widely neglected so far, proper
nancial incentives can help to avoid self selection of high ability workers who
refrain from entering organizations in which a fair reward to performance is
threatened by family ties or strong social ties. If the organization in question
manages to design incentive schemes in such a way that outsiders expect a
fair reward for their performance, the average quality of hired managers, and
hence, the rm performance could rise.
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4.5 Appendix to Chapter 4
4.5.1 Tables and Figures
Decision Player A
AnonymFix FriendFix FriendInc AnonymInc
AnonymFix - 0.069 0.659 0.026
FriendFix 0.069 - 0.007 0.000
FriendInc 0.392 0.007 - 0.046
AnonymInc 0.013 0.000 0.032 -
Table 4.4: Decision Player A: p-values for a two sided (above diagonal) and
one sided (below diagonal) Fisher exact Test between Treatments
Decision Player C
AnonymFix FriendFix FriendInc AnonymInc
AnonymFix - 0.152 1.000 1.000
FriendFix 0.12 - 0.052 0.367
FriendInc 0.629 0.035 - 0.531
AnonymInc 0.5 0.278 0.316 -
Table 4.5: Decision Player C: p-values for a two sided (above diagonal) and
one sided (below diagonal) Fisher exact Test between Treatments
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Figure 4.2: The empirical Distribution of the Friendship Measure
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Figure 4.3: The empirical Distribution of Within-Group Di¤erences in
Friendship Measures
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4.5.2 Instructions
The original instructions are in German. Below you nd the English trans-
lation. Please contact the author for the original instructions. The following
instructions are taken from the FriendInc treatment. Deviations from other
treatments are commented in italic letters.
Welcome to todays experiment
Please read the following instructions carefully. In the instructions, you
will be told everything you need to know for participating in this experiment.
If you do not understand something, please raise your hand. Your question
will be answered privately at your cabin by one of the experimenter.
In the course of the experiment you can earn money. How much you earn
depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. At the end
of the experiment, the money you earned will be paid out in cash. Please
wait in your cabin until the number of your cabin number is called. Please
take all the documents you have gotten from us and hand them back to us
after the payment. In addition to the payment from the actual experiment,
you will get a show-up fee of 2.50e and 1.50e for lling out a questionnaire
at the end of the experiment.
Please notice that you may not communicate with others during the en-
tire experiment. Additionally, we have to point out that you may only use
those functions of your computer which are necessary for the experiment.
Communicating or leaving the experiment screen at your computer will lead
to your exclusion from the experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand, we will come to your
cabin.
Registration of participants
The Registration for this experiment was conducted in two di¤erent ways.
Some participants were invited to participate alone in an experiment on hu-
man behavior. In the other case we invited 2-person groups for participating
in an experiment on human behavior. The members of a 2-person group had
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to register together and therefore know each other. (The Registration part is
missing in the Anonym treatments.)
The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, groups are formed which consist of
3 participants. (In the Anonym treatments we added randomly) In each
group there are 2 participants who have registered together: Player A and
player B. The third participant, player C, has registered alone for the ex-
periment. (In the Anonym treatments, the last two sentences are missing.
Instead I added: Every group consists out of a player A, a player B and a
player C.)
Decision player C
Player C makes exactly one decision. He may choose whether he partic-
ipates in a game with player A and player B or whether he does not par-
ticipate. If player C decides not to participate, players receive the following
payments.
Payments
Player A 8e
Player B 4e
Player C 10e
The decision of player A does not a¤ect the payment then. If player C
decides to participate in the game with player A and Player B, the payment
depends on the decision of player A. Player A and player C do not know
at the time of their decision how the other player is going to decide. Thus,
player A does not know whether Player C will participate in the game. Player
C does not know how player A decides.
Decision player A
Player A makes exactly one decision and does not know how player C
decides. Player A gets an amount of 8e. Player A now has to decide how
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he distributes the amount among player B and player C. He has to give 3e
to one player and 5e to the other player. After player A has distributed the
money it is transferred to the other players, and the amount sent to player
C is additionally multiplied by 3. Player As own payment is dependent on
the payments of the other players. He gets half the payment of the other two
players. (In the Fix treatments the last sentence is replaced by Independent
of the distribution decision player A receives 8e.)
The following payments can arise from the decision:
B receives A receives C receives
A sends 3e to B and 5e to C 3e 3x5e=15e 0.5x3e+0.5x15e=9e
A sends 5e to B und 3e to C 5e 3x3e=9e 0.5x5e+0.5x9e=7e
(In the Fix treatment the last column shows an 8e payo¤ for player A.)
Whether the decision of player A actually leads to the payment listed
in the table depends on whether Player C has decided to participate in the
game.
Summary payment
If player C has decided not to participate, each participant gets a payment
according to the table on page 2, independent of the decision of player A. If
player C has decided to participate in the game, the payments result from
player As decision. (table on this page)
Course of the experiment
Before the experiment, there will be three questions regarding your com-
prehension. The experiment will only start when each participant has an-
swered the questions correctly. At the beginning of the experiment, it is
randomly determined which participant of the registered 2-person groups
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will be player A and who will be Player B. After the experiment, another
instruction will be distributed. Following this, we kindly ask you to ll out
a questionnaire.
Please remain seated after you have lled out the questionnaire until we
call the number of your cabin. Bring this instruction and the number of your
cabin to the front. Only then can the payment of your game results be made.
(The third sentence of this paragraph is replaced in the Anonym treat-
ments: At the beginning of the experiment, we randomly form 3-person
groups.)
The decision situation
In this experiment, you have to make 10 decisions. We show you 10 lines
on your screen. In each line, you make one decision. Each decision is a choice
between an option A and an option B. In both option A and option B you
can win a certain amount of money with a probability of x (in %) or another,
slightly lower amount with the converse probability 1-x. For example, should
you choose line 2 you get 2.00 e with a probability of 20% and 1.60e with
a probability of 80%. Option A and option B only di¤er in the height of the
amount. As soon as all players have made their ten decisions, two lotteries
are drawn. The rst lottery randomly picks one of the 10 lines. Depending on
the Option you chose for this line, either option A or option B gets relevant
for your pay. According to the given probabilities, the second lottery decides
which amount you actually get, the higher or the lower one. Among all
the participants of the experiment we randomly draw 4 persons who get the
amount at the end of the as additional pay. If you have questions, raise your
hand and we will come to your cabin.
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Chapter 5
Result-Based Sampling in
Experimental Economics1
5.1 Introduction
In experimental economics, a stylized project could run as follows: Re-
searchers develop an experimental design to test an economic hypothesis.
They then decide upon the initial sample size, plan and conduct control and
treatment group sessions, and examine the hypothesis with a signicance
test (e.g., t-test, Mann-Whitney U test). The critical level of signicance
is commonly set at 5% or 10% and hypotheses are only supported if the p-
value is below the chosen threshold. Whenever the results are statistically
signicant or clearly above the signicance level, no further data is gathered.
However, if the p-value is slightly above the signicance level, researchers
might decide to increase the initial sample size by conducting additional ex-
perimental sessions. The guiding rationale suggests that there might indeed
be the hypothesized e¤ect, but a larger sample size is needed to uncover this
relationship and obtain statistical signicance. That is, the decision whether
to increase sample size is contingent on results from the initial sample. This
approach, which we label result-based sampling (RBS) in this article, is a
common practice in experimental economics.
1This chapter is based upon Biemann and Herbertz (2011).
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However, there is a major problem with RBS that has not been addressed
so far in the literature. The signicance level determines the probability
that researchers nd signicant results, even if there is no underlying e¤ect.
Thus, the higher the signicance level, the higher the chance to wrongly
nd a treatment e¤ect, even when there is no such e¤ect. Findings that
wrongly support the existence of an e¤ect are Type I Errors (also known as
false positives or alpha errors). To control Type I Error rates, researchers
scrupulously validate their empirical results against the common signicance
levels at 5% or 10%. Whenever p-values are higher than the threshold, results
are reported as insignicant to avoid committing Type I Errors. In RBS,
researchers rst test against the pre-determined signicance level. If and only
if the result is not signicant, additional data is gathered and researchers get
a second chance to nd signicant results, even if there is no true e¤ect.
This adds to the initial signicance level and the actual signicance level will
therefore always be higher in RBS than the pre-dened signicance level of
5% or 10%. RBS produces an ination of the Type I Error.
Simmons et al. (2011) show that a step-wise sample size extension in-
creases the Type I Error rate. In addition to Simmons et al. (2011), we
explore how, and to which extent RBS causes Type I Error ination in exper-
imental economics.2 We examine whether this problem of RBS is practically
relevant to researchers, as opposed to being merely an exercise in statisti-
cal pedantry. By simulating settings commonly encountered in experimental
economics, we provide evidence of a substantial Type I Error ination. Un-
der reasonable assumptions, RBS results in 7.7% wrong positive results if the
chosen level of signicance is 5%.3 Consequently, we provide suggestions for
how to overcome this ination.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In section 5.2, we
briey discuss Type I Error ination in statistical hypothesis testing by point-
ing out similarities and di¤erences between RBS and multiple testing in gen-
eral. In section 5.3, we introduce our simulation approach and analyze the
2Note, that by the time of our simulation (May to September 2011) Simmons et al.
(2011) was not published. A working paper was not available.
3As will be explained in section 5.4, these numbers stem from scenarios with a maximum
number of 2 RBSs and a RBS threshold of 20%.
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impact of RBS on Type I Error. Section 5.4 examines important determi-
nants of Type I Error ination in RBS. Lastly, in section 5.5 and section 5.6,
we discuss our results and make suggestions for how to overcome or attenuate
Type I Error ination in RBS. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Type I Error Ination in Statistical Hy-
pothesis Testing
RBS involves the conditional application of more than one statistical test on
related datasets. If the rst test fails, the dataset is extended and a second
test is performed. For a single statistical test, the probability of making
a Type I Error is correctly indicated by the signicance level. Whenever
a multitude of tests are applied to a dataset, the probability of making a
Type I Error for this family of tests is higher than for the single test. We
are not aware of any literature that discusses this problem for RBS. We will
therefore ground our work on a discussion for group comparisons that involve
more than two groups (e.g., ANOVA). Methodological considerations from
this related area can help to gain a better understanding of the problem
in RBS. Similarities and di¤erences to RBS will later be used to develop
simulation settings and discuss statistical remedies for RBS.
Multiple group comparisons are frequently encountered in experimental
economics whenever several experimental conditions are assessed. Let us as-
sume that mean di¤erences between a control group and ve independent
treatment groups are compared. The Type I Error rate is set to 5% for each
test, but the probability that one or more of these tests yields a statisti-
cally signicant result is 1   0:955 = 0:226. The importance of looking at
this much higher familywise error rate is well-known for multiple compar-
isons. Several procedures have been suggested in the literature that correct
for the increased Type I Error. For example, when a Bonferroni correction
in ANOVA is applied, a result from a pair-wise comparison is considered
statistically signicant if the p-value is smaller than alpha=n, where n is the
number of independent tests performed on the data and alpha denotes the
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chosen signicance level. When a control group is compared to ve treat-
ment groups and alpha = 5%, the adjusted signicance level is 0.05/5 = 0.01.
Thus, the p-value of any comparison must be smaller than 1% to be inter-
preted as a statistically signicant result at the 5% level. Other procedures
are the LSD test, Sche¤é method, Tukeys HSD, and the idák correction
(Savin (1980)).
These multiple comparison procedures were designed for tests that are
conducted simultaneously and independently. In RBS, a second test is only
performed if the previous result was non-signicant. Furthermore, results
from additional tests in RBS are not independent from the previous test, as
the initial sample is extended, but not replaced. That is, all observations
from the initial sample are part of the extended sample. This follows that a
familywise error rate cannot be computed, as in the case of n independent
tests, which, in turn, makes it impossible to transfer existing multiple com-
parison procedures to RBS. The most important di¤erence between RBS and
multiple testing is the sequential approach in RBS, because the application
of further statistical tests is contingent on the results of the previous test.
When researchers use an uncorrected signicance level in the initial sample
(i.e., 5% or 10%), any nding that turns a non-signicant nding from the
rst trial into a signicant nding in extended samples would add to the
initial error rate. It follows that Type I Error ination can only be avoided if
all researchers test their initial sample against a signicance level below the
common signicance level of a single test, keeping in mind that they would
increase the sample size in the case of the rst test being non-signicant.
This procedure is impossible from the practical point of view. However, the
extent to which Type I Errors are inated has yet to be demonstrated in
the literature. With this goal in mind, we report results from Monte Carlo
simulations in the next section. Subsequently, we will use simulation results
to discuss means to avoid or alleviate Type I Error ination in RBS.
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5.3 Simulation and Results
We conceptualized RBS as a stepwise approach that starts with an initial
sample that is extended, if the rst results are non-signicant. This sequence
of conditional events is reected in the simulation settings. To illustrate
our simulation approach, we have chosen a simple and coherent example,
later generalized to other settings. Let us assume that researchers state an
economic hypothesis in that the mean value in a treatment group A is not
equal to the mean value in the control group B, hence A 6= B. They
conduct an experiment in period 1 and gain a total of 40 observations that
are equally split over treatment and control group (nexperimental = ncontrol =
20). They then test the null hypothesis H0 : A = B with a t-test and
a signicance level of 5% (two-tailed). We simulated this experiment by
drawing 20 observations for group A and 20 observations for group B from a
normally distributed variable (M = 0, s.d. = 1). Our goal was an estimation
of Type I Error ination. This error only occurs if there is no true e¤ect, but
signicant results wrongly indicate the existence of an e¤ect. The absence
of a true e¤ect is simulated via identical mean values for experimental and
control group (Mexperimental =Mcontrol = 0). The comparison of group means
with a statistical test can fall into one of three categories (see gure 5.1):
p < 5%. The researchers nd support for the alternative hypothesis
A 6= B. They conclude that no further sessions are needed and aim to
publish the results.
5% < p < pRBS. Results are not signicant, but the p-value is so low that
it seems appropriate to increase the sample size, i.e., apply RBS. This upper
limit of the p-value for RBS is denoted by pRBS. The underlying assumption
is that researchers will not necessarily increase the sample size. Instead, they
will evaluate costs and potential benets of an extended sample. We there-
fore dened the critical p-value pRBS, which reects these considerations. If
the p-value from the rst statistical test is within this range, additional data
are gathered to increase the sample size. We implemented this step in the
simulation by adding 20 observations to the initial sample size in an addi-
tional period, again being equally split over treatment and control group. A
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Figure 5.1: The Simulation Process
t-test was then calculated that used the total sample.
p > pRBS. The p-values are above the threshold pRBS that would justify
additional data gathering. Similar to the rst case with a signicant result,
researchers stop the data gathering process at this point, but will most likely
not try to publish the result, as they are aware of the connection between sig-
nicant results and publication probability (Sterling (1959) and Easterbrook
et al. (1991)).
Overall, the simulation procedure, as depicted in gure 5.1, contains
a conditional loop executed whenever the p-value of the sample is non-
signicant, but is below pRBS. As a further limitation, we restricted the
maximum number of additional samples to k, because it is not plausible to
assume that researchers extend the sample an unlimited number of times. In
the most simple case, k is set to one, which means that researchers might
increase the initial sample a single time. Results from this setting are illus-
trated in gure 5.2.4 Figure 5.2 shows a histogram of p-values for the rst
and second period (i.e., k = 1) with pRBS < 20% andMexperimental =Mcontrol.
The upper part of the gure illustrates the simulated p-values from the rst
4All simulations were coded in the R language of statistical computing (R-Development-
Team (2008)) based on 1,000,000 drawings for each setting.
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period. Because there is no true underlying e¤ect, p-values follow a uniform
distribution and, for example, 4.9% of all simulated p-values are found in the
interval from 0% to 5%. Thus, in 4.9% of all simulated experiments, the re-
sult is statistically signicant, although there is no true e¤ect. This correctly
represents the Type I Error rate of 5% with a small deviation due to sam-
pling error. In period 2, we simulated additional data whenever the results in
period 1 were non-signicant, but below the threshold of 20% (pRBS < 20%).
This was the case in about 15% of all simulated experiments. The lower part
of gure 5.2 shows results after period 2. Most importantly, the percentage
of ndings with a p-value below 5% increased from 4.9% in period 1 to 6.8%
in period 2. Thus, from the 15% of samples that were extended in period 2,
about 1.9% delivered statistically signicant result. Simulation parameters
were chosen to show no true e¤ect, and hence, all signicant results were
Type I Errors. The probability of committing a Type I Error was therefore
not 5% as indicated, but about 6.9% instead; a relative increase of about
39% percent. In other words, researchers that apply RBS have a 39% higher
chance of wrongly nding statistical di¤erences in settings where no true ef-
fect is present. In the following, we will refer to this actual fraction of wrong
positive results as RBS. The di¤erence between the "true" signicance level
of 5% or 10% and RBS denes the ination of the Type I Error due to RBS.
5.4 Determinants of Type I Error Ination
The simulation in the previous section was restricted to a specic set of para-
meters. We now present results from simulations in which we systematically
vary the most important parameters. More specically, we analyze the Type
I Error ination when the upper limit of p-values (pRBS) for additional data
changes, the maximum number of additional data gathering periods (k) is
altered, and other statistical tests are applied.
Figure 5.3 graphically depicts simulation results when k and pRBS are
varied. Table 5.1 in the Appendix illustrates the respective numerical simu-
lation results. The horizontal rhs axis in gure 5.3 plots k, the horizontal lhs
axis plots the respective threshold pRBS in 2.5% steps, and the vertical axis
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Figure 5.2: Histogram of p-values after rst and second Sampling
shows the actual alpha error RBS, which is estimated from the simulations.
As can be seen in the graph, the actual Type I Error increases with both k
and pRBS. When k increases, there were more periods in which samples in
the critical area of p-values (5% < p < pRBS) were extended and got another
chance to reach statistical signicance. Furthermore, gure 5.3 indicates that
Type I Error ination decreases with k, because in each period, fewer sam-
ples were left in the critical area of p-values, and hence, less samples were
supplemented with additional data. As can be seen from the upper panel
in gure 5.2, about 15% of all samples had p-values in the 5% < p < 20%
interval after period 1 and only 5.5% after period 2. Thus, only 5.5% are
found in the critical range in which hypothetical researchers would add ad-
ditional data in a further period . Hence, the Type I Error ination e¤ect is
decreasing with k.
With an increasing pRBS, the number of samples that were extended in
each period was higher and, hence, there were more samples that became
signicant after adding data. This is shown by the positive trend of RBS
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Figure 5.3: RBS in Dependence of the Sampling Threshold pRBS and the
Number of Samplings k
with increasing pRBS. Again, the additional e¤ect on RBS is decreasing
with an increase of pRBS. The reason is that researchers with insignicant
results but relatively low p-values are more likely to get signicant results
after adding data in the following period than researchers with higher p-
values. For example, the Type I Error ination from raising the threshold
pRBS from 10% to 15% is higher than from raising the threshold from 20%
to 25%.
In the previous simulations, we drew observations from a normal distri-
bution and conducted t-tests. This constellation is appropriate in the sense
that the applied test ts perfectly with the true distribution of the under-
lying data. Of course, this setting is rare in experimental economics, since
non-parametric statistical tests are mostly applied. We conducted a series of
additional simulations to test the robustness of our results (details are avail-
able from the authors upon request). Overall, we found that our results were
robust to variations in the underlying distributions and tests. For example,
gure 5.4 and table 5.2 in the Appendix show results for drawing from a
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normal distribution, but testing with a Mann-Whitney U test. Changes in
RBS are very similar to what we reported in table 5.1 for t-tests. That is
not very surprising, as the mechanism that results in an ination of Type I
Errors is a property of RBS itself and not limited to a specic statistical test
or distribution.
5.5 Discussion
The goal of this study was to assess Type I Error ination caused by re-
searchersstrategy to increase an initial sample in an experiment if the results
from statistical tests are somewhat above the threshold for statistical signif-
icance. By means of simulation, we illustrate that this approach, labeled
RBS, yields a substantial underestimation of the true signicance level. For
example, if the signicance level was set to 5% and we further assume that
researchers increase the initial data up to two more times (k = 2) whenever
p-values are between 5% and 20%, the true alpha level is 7.7%. That is,
there is a probability of 7.7% (not 5%) that a result is signicant, even if
there is no true underlying e¤ect. Given the strictness that researchers ex-
hibit when evaluating results of statistical tests, this is an alarming ination
of the Type I Error. Therefore, our conclusion is that experimenters should
not apply RBS. However, it must be noted that our recommendation only
a¤ects RBS in statistical hypothesis testing. We do not intend to condemn
all forms of pre-testing and stepwise sampling. Instead, we would like to
o¤er the following set of guidelines that experimental researchers can use
whenever they seek to gather data in a stepwise fashion.
1. Pre-determine sample sizes.
RBS can be avoided if researchers dene the target sample size a priori.
Often researchers apply RBS because they are unsure whether the initial
sample will be of a su¢ cient size. Power analyses have been developed to
avoid these problems. Whenever information is available on expected e¤ect
sizes, they have been proven to be a useful tool for a priori sample size
calculations. We will discuss this tool in section 5.6.
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2. Stay the course in the case of signicant pre-results.
Researchers can examine rst results while the experiment is running.
But results from this study show that researchers should not stop data gath-
ering because signicant results were found before the nal sample size was
reached. It is less critical if researchers stop the data gathering process when
results are non-signicant, because then Type I Errors cannot be committed.
Therefore, we suggest that researchers should only intend to publish research
ndings when they are based on the full pre-dened sample.
3. Do not extend the pre-dened sample size.
If the pre-dened sample size is reached and results are non-signicant,
researchers should not continue to add data to the existing dataset. Other-
wise, they create the same Type I Error ination described in this study.
4. Report the sampling approach.
Researchers should report the pre-dened sample size and explain devi-
ations from the actual sample size. There might be situations that justify
changes in the sampling procedure. However, whenever adjustments are
based on RBS, this should be noted and explained.
5.6 Power Analysis
Problems with RBS let us conclude that researchers must dene their sample
size before data gathering, instead of extending the sample post-hoc. How-
ever, researchers might be unsure whether a pre-dened sample size will be
su¢ cient to test their hypotheses. For researchers, it is important to mini-
mize the probability that a true e¤ect remains undetected in an experiment.
This beta error () occurs whenever there is a true underlying e¤ect, but the
result of a statistical test is not signicant and, thus, a correct hypothesis
does not nd support in the data (Cohen (1988); Murphy and Myors (2004)).
The reverse probability (i.e., 1   ) is the statistical power of a test. It is
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dened as the probability to reject a null hypothesis when the null hypothe-
sis is indeed false. Although there is vast amount of literature on statistical
power and power analyses in the psychological literature and some related
elds, little is known about this concept in experimental economics. We will
therefore provide a brief overview on power analyses to arm experimental
economists with the relevant knowledge to perform ex ante calculations of
su¢ cient sample size.5
In statistical inference testing, signicance level, population e¤ect size,
sample size, and statistical power form a closed system. Any parameter can
be computed if values for the other three are set. Thus, the necessary sample
size for an experiment can be derived from desired values for signicance
level and statistical power, and the hypothesized e¤ect size. The signicance
level is mostly set to 5%. Although there is no convention, a minimum
statistical power of 0.80 is considered adequate (Cohen (1988)). That is,
the probability that a true e¤ect is not signicant in a statistical test is less
than 20 percent. Lastly, the e¤ect size must be estimated, because a smaller
sample is necessary if the underlying e¤ect is large. Small e¤ects, on the
contrary, only have a high chance of being statistically signicant in very
large samples. For comparisons of mean values, the e¤ect size is expressed
in d, dened as the di¤erence of the group means divided by the standard
deviation. As a rule of thumb, one can think of large e¤ects whenever d 
0.80, medium e¤ects for d around 0.50, and small e¤ects for d around 0.20
(Cohen (1988)). E¤ect size measures can be found for other statistical tests
as well, for example, correlation coe¢ cients and ANOVAs. There are several
tools available that perform power calculations, most notably the freeware
G*Power (Faul et al. (2007)), which computes the value of the fourth variable,
if the other three variables are dened. For example, we are interested in an
economic e¤ect with a large e¤ect size (d = 0.80), with a signicance level of
5 percent (two-tailed) and a power of 0.80. Then, results from power analyses
show that we would need 26 individuals in each of the two groups to have
an 80 percent probability of detecting a true e¤ect. For a small e¤ect (d
5An extensive discussion of statistical power goes well beyond the scope of this paper.
We refer the interested reader to Cohen (1988) and Murphy and Myors (2004).
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= 0.20) and similar settings, we would need 394 individuals in each group.
Experimental economists would be well advised if power analyses are part
of research planning to optimize resource allocation, because large samples
may not be necessary to detect large e¤ects and small samples su¤er from
low statistical power when e¤ect sizes are small. In the latter case, there is a
high probability that true small e¤ects are undetected, because they are not
likely to be statistically signicant in hypothesis testing.
5.7 Conclusion
We show, by means of Monte Carlo simulations, that the practice of RBS
in experimental economics leads to substantial Type I Error Ination. Fur-
thermore, RBS cannot be corrected ex post, because if the hypothesis test
with the initial sample is tested against the common thresholds for statistical
signicance (5% or 10%), any signicant nding in extended samples raises
the Type I Error above the pre-dened level. Although RBS was shown to
bias results from statistical hypothesis tests, for researchers, there is no in-
centive to avoid RBS. Therefore, we hope that our ndings help to create an
awareness of the problems associated with RBS, which might then improve
research and policy implications in experimental economics.
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5.8 Appendix to Chapter 5
0 1 2 3 4 5
5.0% 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
7.5% 0.050 0.055 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.056
10.0% 0.050 0.060 0.0612 0.062 0.062 0.062
12.5% 0.050 0.063 0.066 0.068 0.0680 0.0680
15.0% 0.050 0.066 0.071 0.072 0.073 0.073
17.5% 0.050 0.068 0.074 0.076 0.077 0.078
20.0% 0.049 0.069 0.077 0.080 0.081 0.083
22.5% 0.049 0.071 0.079 0.083 0.085 0.087
25.0% 0.050 0.072 0.082 0.087 0.089 0.090
Table 5.1: Simulated Type I Errors from Figure 5.3
0 1 2 3 4 5
5.0% 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
7.5% 0.049 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055
10.0% 0.048 0.058 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.062
12.5% 0.049 0.061 0.065 0.067 0.066 0.066
15.0% 0.049 0.065 0.070 0.071 0.071 0.072
17.5% 0.049 0.067 0.073 0.075 0.076 0.077
20.0% 0.049 0.069 0.075 0.078 0.080 0.080
22.5% 0.049 0.070 0.078 0.082 0.085 0.085
25.0% 0.049 0.071 0.080 0.084 0.0870 0.088
Table 5.2: Simulated Type I Errors from Figure 5.4
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